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Randomness Efficient Steganography
Abstract. Steganographic protocols enable one to embed covert mes-
sages into inconspicuous data over a public communication channel in
such a way that no one, aside from the sender and the intended re-
ceiver, can even detect the presence of the secret message. In this pa-
per, we provide a new provably-secure, private-key steganographic en-
cryption protocol secure in the framework of Hopper et al [2]. We first
present a “one-time stegosystem” that allows two parties to transmit
messages of fixed length (depending on the length of the shared key)
with information-theoretic security guarantees. Employing a pseudoran-
dom generator (PRG) permits secure transmission of longer messages
in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad
encryption for long messages in a symmetric encryption framework. The
advantage of our construction, compared to all previous work is random-
ness efficiency : in the information theoretic setting our protocol embeds
a message of length n bits using a shared secret key of length (1+ o(1))n
bits while achieving security 2−n/ polylog n; simply put this gives a rate
of key over message that is 1 as n → ∞ (the previous best result [5]
achieved a constant rate > 1 regardless of the security offered). In this
sense, our protocol is the first truly randomness efficient steganographic
system and breaks through a natural barrier imposed by bounded-round
rejecting sampling. Furthermore, in our protocol, we can permit a por-
tion of the shared secret key to be public while retaining precisely n
private key bits. In this setting, by separating the public and the private
randomness of the shared key, we achieve security of 2−n. Our result
comes as an effect of a novel application of randomness extractors to
stegosystem design.
1 Introduction
The steganographic communication problem can be described using Simmons’ [15]
formulation of the problem: Alice and Bob are prisoners who wish to communi-
cate securely in the presence of an adversary, called the “Warden.” The warden
monitors the communication channel to detect whether they exchange “conspicu-
ous” messages. In particular, Alice and Bob are permitted to exchange messages
that adhere to certain channel distributions that represent “inconspicuous” com-
munication, but may not detectably stray from this distribution. By controlling
the messages transmitted over such a channel, however, Alice and Bob may in
fact exchange messages that cannot be detected by the Warden. There have
been two approaches in formalizing this problem, one based on information the-
ory [1, 17, 6] and one based on complexity theory [2, 5]. The latter approach is
more concrete and has the potential of allowing more efficient constructions.
Most steganographic constructions supported by provable security guaran-
tees are instantiations of the following basic procedure (often referred to as
“rejection-sampling”). The problem specifies a family of message distributions
(the “channel distributions”) that provide a number of possible options for a so-
called “covertext” to be transmitted. Additionally, the sender and the receiver
possess some sort of private information (typically a keyed hash function, MAC,
or other similar function) that maps channel messages to a single bit. In order
to send a message bit m, the sender draws a covertext from the channel distri-
bution, applies the function to the covertext and checks whether it happens to
produce the “stegotext” m she originally wished to transmit. If this is the case,
the covertext is transmitted. In case of failure, this procedure is repeated.
The complexity-theoretic approach to steganography considers the follow-
ing experiment for the warden-adversary: The adversary selects a message to
be embedded and receives either covertexts that embed the message or cover-
texts simply drawn from the channel distribution (without any embedding). The
adversary is then asked to distinguish between the two cases. Clearly, if the prob-
ability of success is very close to 1/2 it is natural to claim that the stegosystem
provides security against such (eavesdropping) adversarial activity. Formulation
of stronger attacks (such as active attacks) is also possible.
Given the above framework, Kiayias et al. [4] (a full version appears in [5])
define a notion of one-time stegosystem: this is a steganographic protocol that
is meant to be used for a single message transmission and is proven secure in
an information-theoretic sense, provided that the key shared between the sender
and the receiver is of sufficient length. This system is a natural analogue of a
one-time pad for steganography. They then point out that this can be used to
induce a system for longer messages using standard techniques. We shall adopt
this same perspective, focusing on achieving optimal usage of randomness.
In this paper, we present a steganography protocol that embeds a message
of length n using a shared secret key of length (1 + o(1))n bits while achieving
security 2−n/ polylogn. In this sense, our protocol is truly randomness efficient:
the rate of key over message approaches 1 for large values of n. In the previous
best known protocol [4], the length of the shared secret key is at least (2+o(1))n
bits, regardless of the security achieved. The key length requirement of (2+o(1))n
bits was dictated by the fact that they perform “single” rejection sampling,
in which case some of the randomness used to interrogate the channel during
rejection sampling is discarded; as a result they must use a 2n-wise independent
family of functions (where n is the length of the message).
Our improvement involves a number of technical elements: we introduce the
use of randomness extractors in this context and perform a variant of rejection
sampling which is more efficient in its use of the shared secret key. However,
this randomness-efficient notion of rejection requires that we control significant
new dependencies in the resulting distribution of covertexts. Thus, while the
relative improvement in the number of random bits used by our protocol is
not particularly impressive (we save a factor 1/2 over previous results), the
constructions seems interesting because (i.) it achieves asymptotically optimal
usage of randomness and (ii.) develops a novel steganographic protocol. We
remark, finally, that we can permit a portion of the shared secret key to be
public while retaining precisely n private key bits. In this setting, by separating
the public and the private randomness of the shared key, we can achieve security
of 2−n. We adopt the model of channel abstraction first defined by von Ahn [16]
(and also used in [5]).
At the heart of our result is the pairing of the rejection sampling process with
a randomness extractor. Extractors have been used widely in cryptographic ap-
plications and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time extractors
have been employed in the design of steganographic protocols. Given our one-
time stegosystem, it is fairly straightforward now to construct provably secure
steganographic encryption for longer messages by using a pseudorandom genera-
tor (PRG) to stretch a random seed that is shared by the sender and the receiver
to sufficient length as shown in [5]. The resulting stegosystem is provably secure
in the complexity theoretic model.
2 Preliminaries
We use the notation x← X to denote sampling an element x from a distribution
X and the notation x ∈R S to denote sampling an element x uniformly at random
from a set S. For a function f and a distribution X on its domain, f(X) denotes
the distribution that results from sampling x from X and applying f to x. The
uniform distribution on {0, 1}d is denoted by Ud. We use the notation |s| to
stand for the number of symbols in a string s. For a probability distribution D
with support X , the notation PrD[x] denotes the probability that D assigns to
x ∈ X . The cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S|. The concatenation of string
s1 and string s2 is denoted by s1 ◦ s2. “log” indicates the logarithm base 2.
Pointwise ǫ-biased functions
Definition 1 ([16]). Let P be a distribution with a finite support X. A func-
tion f : X → Y is said to be pointwise ǫ-biased with respect to P if ∀y ∈ Y
|Prx←P [f(x) = y]− 1/|Y | | < ǫ .
In this paper, we refer to such functions as ǫ-biased and drop the “pointwise”
qualification for simplicity.
Min-entropy A distributionX is said to have min-entropy of t bits if the probabil-
ity it assigns to each element in its range is bounded above by 2−t. A distribution
with min-entropy at least t is called a t-source.
Definition 2. The min-entropy of a random variable X, taking values in a set
V , is the quantity H∞(X) , minv∈V (− logPr[X = v]) .
Statistical Distance We use statistical distance to measure the distance between
two random variables. Shoup [14] presents a detailed discussion on statistical
distance and its properties.
Definition 3. Let X and Y be random variables which both take values in a
finite set S with probability distributions PX and PY . The statistical distance
between X and Y is defined as ∆ [X,Y ] , (1/2)
∑
s∈S |PX(s)− PY (s)|. We say
that X and Y are ǫ-close if ∆ [X,Y ] ≤ ǫ.
We will use the following properties of statistical distance which follow directly
from the definition.
Fact 1 Let X, Y and Z be random variables taking values in a finite set S.
We have (i.) 0 ≤ ∆ [X,Y ] ≤ 1 and (ii.) the triangle inequality: ∆ [X,Z] ≤
∆ [X,Y ] +∆ [Y, Z].
Fact 2 ([14]) If S and T are finite sets, X and Y are random variables taking
values in the set S and f : S → T is a function, then ∆ [f(X), f(Y )] ≤ ∆ [X,Y ].
Lemma 1. Consider two random variables (X,Y ) and (X ′, Y ′), both taking val-
ues in X×Y. For a particular value x ∈ X in the support of X, we let Yx denote
the random variable Y conditioned on the event X = x and define Y ′x likewise.
Then ∆ [(X,Y ) , (X ′, Y ′)] ≤ ∆ [X,X ′] + EX
[
∆ [YX , Y
′
X ]
]
.
We include the proof in Appendix C for completeness.
2.1 Extractors
Extractors are deterministic functions that operate on arbitrary distributions
with sufficient randomness and output “almost” uniformly distributed, indepen-
dent random bits. Extractors require an additional input: a short seed of truly
random bits as a catalyst to “extract” randomness from such distributions. Thus
the input to an extractor contains two independent sources of randomness: the ac-
tual distribution (the source) and the seed. Extractors were first defined by Nisan
and Zuckerman [9].
Definition 4. A (t, ǫ)-extractor is a function Ext : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}µ
such that for every distribution X on {0, 1}ν with H∞(X) ≥ t, the distribution
Ext(X,Ud) is ǫ-close to the uniform distribution on {0, 1}µ.
For our application, we require a stronger property from the extractor. We
need the output of the extractor to remain essentially uniform even given the
knowledge of the seed used. In other words, we require the extractor to extract
randomness only from the source and not from the seed. A way of enforcing this
condition is to demand that when the seed is concatenated to the output, the re-
sulting distribution is still ǫ-close to uniform. Such an extractor is called a strong
extractor to distinguish from the weaker notion of extractors defined above. The
extractors defined above guarantee to extract randomness from t-sources on an
average seed while strong extractors guarantee to extract randomness for most
seeds. In this paper, we use the term extractor to refer to a strong extractor.
Definition 5. A (t, ǫ)-strong extractor is a function Ext : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}µ such that for every distribution X on {0, 1}ν with H∞(X) ≥ t, the dis-
tribution S ◦Ext(X,S) is ǫ-close to the uniform distribution on {0, 1}µ+d where
S is distributed according to Ud.
We refer to ν as the length of the source, t as the min-entropy threshold, ǫ
as the error of the extractor, the ratio t/ν as the entropy rate of the source X
and to the ratio µ/t as the fraction of randomness extracted by the extractor.
The entropy loss of the extractor is defined as t + d − µ. The two inputs of
the extractor have a total min-entropy of at least t + d and the entropy loss
measures how much of this randomness was “lost” in the extraction process.
Radhakrishnan and Ta-shma [10] showed that no non-trivial (t, ǫ)-extractor can
extract all the randomness present in its inputs and must suffer an entropy loss of
2 log(1/ǫ)+O(1). For our application, we need efficient, explicit strong extractor
constructions as defined below.
Definition 6 ([13]). For functions t(ν), ǫ(ν), d(ν), µ(ν) a family Ext = {Extν}
of functions Extν : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}d(ν) → {0, 1}µ(ν) is an explicit (t, ǫ)-strong
extractor if Ext(x, y) can be computed in polynomial time in its input length and
for every ν, Extν is a (t(ν), ǫ(ν))-extractor.
An important property of strong extractors which makes it attractive for
our application is that for any t-source, a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the seeds extract
randomness from that source.
Remark ([12]). Let Ext : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}µ be a (t, ǫ)-strong extractor.
From the definition of a strong extractor, we know that Es [∆ [Ext(X, s), Uµ]] ≤ ǫ
where s ∈R {0, 1}d. By applying Markov’s inequality, we can see that
Prs[∆ [Ext(X, s), Uµ] ≥ ǫ · r] ≤ 1/r.
See the survey articles by Shaltiel [13], Nisan [7], and Nisan and Ta-Shma
[8] for more details on extractors and their properties. In this paper, we use
the explicit strong extractor construction by Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [11]
which works on sources of any min-entropy. It extracts all the min-entropy using
O(log3 ν) additional random seed bits while achieving an optimal entropy loss
(up to an additive constant) of χ = 2 log(1/ǫ) +O(1) bits.
Theorem 1 (RRV Extractor [11]). For every ν, t ∈ N, and ǫ > 0 such that
t ≤ ν, there are explicit (t, ǫ)-strong extractors Ext : {0, 1}ν×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}t−χ
with entropy loss χ = 2 log(1/ǫ) +O(1) bits and requiring seeds of length
d = O(log2 ν · log(1/ǫ) · log t) bits.
2.2 The channel model
The security of a steganography protocol is measured by the adversary’s abil-
ity to distinguish between “normal” and “covert” message distributions over a
communication channel. To characterize normal communication we define and
formalize the communication channel following standard terminology used in the
literature [2, 1, 16, 5, 3]. We let Σ denote the symbols of an alphabet and treat
the channel as a family of distributions C = {Ch}h∈Σ∗; each Ch is supported
on Σ. These channel distributions model a history-dependent notion of channel
data.
We adopt the model of channel abstraction first defined by von Ahn and
Hopper [16]. Here, Alice is provided with a means for sampling “deep into the
channel.” In particular, Alice and, consequently, the steganographic encoding
protocol, has access to a channel oracle that can sample from the channel for
any history. Formally, during the embedding process, Alice may sample from
Ch1◦...◦hℓ for any history she wishes (though Alice is constrained to be efficient
and so can make no more than polynomially many queries of polynomial length).
This model allows Alice to transform a channel C with min-entropy δ into a
channel Cπ with min-entropy πδ. Specifically, the channel Cπ is defined over
the alphabet Σπ, whose elements we write as vectors h = (h1, . . . , hπ). The
distribution Cπ
h1,...,hv is determined by the channel C with history h
1
1 ◦ · · · ◦
h1π ◦ h21 ◦ · · · ◦ hvπ. This definition captures the adaptive nature of the channel by
taking into account the dependence between symbols as is typical in real world
communications. We assume that the channel satisfies a min-entropy constraint
for all histories. We say that a channel has min-entropy δ if ∀h ∈ Σ∗, H∞(Ch) ≥
δ. Observe that this implies that H∞(C
π
h ) ≥ δπ due to the additive nature of
marginal min-entropy.
2.3 One-time stegosystem
Here, we give the definition of a one-time stegosystem, a steganographic system
that enables the one-time steganographic transmission of a message provided
that the two parties share a suitable key. We adopt the definitions used by Kiayias
et al. [5].
Definition 7. A one-time stegosystem consists of three probabilistic polynomial
time algorithms S = (SK, SE, SD), where:
– SK is the key generation algorithm; we write SK(1k) = κ. It produces a
key κ of length k.
– SE is the embedding procedure and has access to the channel; SE (κ,m;O) =
s ∈ Σ∗. The embedding procedure takes into account the history h of com-
munication that has taken place between Alice and Bob thus far and begins
its operation corresponding to this history. It takes as input the key κ of
length k, a message m of length n = n(k) and accesses the channel through
an (probabilistic) oracle O. The oracle O accepts as input any polynomial
length history h′ ∈ Σ∗ and allows SE to draw independent samples repeat-
edly from Ch◦h′ . The output is the stegotext s ∈ Σ∗. Observe that in a
one-time stegosystem, once a security parameter k is chosen, the length of
the message n is a fixed function of k. In our model of channel abstraction,
SE can access the channel for any history.
– SD is the extraction procedure; SD (κ, c) = m. It takes as input the key κ
of length k, and some c ∈ Σ∗. The output is a message m.
We next define a notion of correctness for a one-time stegosystem.
Definition 8 (Correctness). A one-time stegosystem (SK, SE, SD) is said to
be (ǫ, δ)-correct provided that for all channels C of min-entropy δ, it holds that
∀h ∈ Σ∗
∀m ∈ {0, 1}n(k) Pr[SD(κ, SE(κ,m;O)) 6= m | κ← SK(1k)] ≤ ǫ .
In general, we treat both ǫ = ǫ(k) and δ = δ(k) as functions of k, the security
parameter and the oracle O as a function of the history h.
One-time stegosystem security is based on the indistinguishability between a
transmission that contains a steganographically embedded message and a trans-
mission that contains no embedded messages. The adversarial game discussed
next is meant to model the behavior of a warden in the Simmons’ formulation
of the problem discussed earlier.
An adversary A against a one-time stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) is a pair
of algorithms A = (SA1, SA2), that plays the following game, denoted G
A(1k):
1. A key κ is generated by SK(1k).
2. Algorithm SA1 receives as input the security parameter k and outputs a
triple (m∗, aux, hc) ∈ Mn × {0, 1}∗ × Σ∗, where aux is some auxiliary infor-
mation that will be passed to SA2. SA1 is provided access to the channel
via the oracle O, which takes the history h as input. The channel oracle O,
on input h, returns to SA1 an element c selected according to Ch. This way,
the adversary can learn about the channel distribution for any history.
3. A bit b is chosen uniformly at random.
– If b = 0, let c∗ ← SE(κ,m∗;O), so c∗ is a stegotext.
– If b = 1, let c∗ = c1◦· · ·◦cλ where λ = |SE(κ,m∗;O)| and ci r← Ch◦c1◦···◦ci−1 .
In this case, c∗ ← Cλh .
4. The input for SA2 is 1
k, hc, c
∗ and aux. SA2 outputs a bit b
′. If b′ = b then
we say that (SA1, SA2) succeeded and write G
A(1k) = success.
The advantage of the adversaryA over a stegosystem S is defined as:AdvAS (k) =∣∣Pr [GA(1k) = success]− 1/2∣∣.
The probability includes the coin tosses of A and SE. The (information-
theoretic) insecurity of the stegosystem is defined as
InSecS(k) = max
A
{AdvAS (k)} ,
this maximum taken over all (time unbounded) adversaries A.
Definition 9 (Security). We say that a stegosystem is (ǫ, δ)-secure if for all
channels with min-entropy δ we have InSecS(k) ≤ ǫ.
Overhead. The overhead of a one-time stegosystem is judged by the relation of
the key length k and message length n. We adopt the ratio k/n as the measure
of overhead as first defined by Kiayias et al. [5].
2.4 Rejection Sampling
As noted before, a common method used in steganography employing a channel
distribution is that of rejection sampling (cf. [1, 2, 5]). We use a variant of
rejection sampling to transmit bit vectors as opposed to a single bit. To transmit
bit vectors, we amplify the entropy of the channel as discussed before and apply
ρ-rejection sampling described below. More precisely, we transform a channel
C with min-entropy δ into a channel Cπ with min-entropy πδ, defined over
the alphabet Σπ. We now perform ρ-rejection sampling over Cπ as described:
Assuming that one wishes to transmit a bit vector m ∈ {0, 1}η and employs
a random function f : Σπ → {0, 1}η, one performs the following “rejection
sampling” process:
Rej
f
h(m, ρ)
let j = 0
repeat:
sample c← Cπh , increment j
until f(c) = m or (j > ρ)
output: c
For a given history h, the procedureRejfh(m, ρ) draws independent samples from
the channel distribution Cπh in rounds until f(c) = m or j > ρ. As there are at
most a total of ρ+1 rounds, if none of the first ρ samples drawn map to the target
bit vector, the sample drawn at round ρ+ 1 is returned by the procedure. Here,
as defined before, Σπ denotes the output alphabet of the channel, h denotes the
history of the channel at the start of the process, and Cπh denotes the marginal
distribution on sequences of π symbols given by the channel after history h.
The receiver (also privy to the function f) applies the function to the received
message c ∈ Σπ and recovers m with a certain probability of success. Note that
the above process performs ρ+1 draws from the channel with the same history.
These draws are assumed to be independent. One basic property of rejection
sampling that we use is:
Lemma 2 ([16]). If the function f is ǫ-biased on Cπh for history h, then for
any ρ and uniformly random m ∈R {0, 1}η:
∆
[
Rej
f
h(m, ρ), C
π
h
]
≤ ǫ.
Proof. Let us denote the samples drawn by the procedure Rejfh(m, ρ) as ci, i =
1, · · · , ρ + 1. Suppose the target bit vector m was chosen with the probability
P
(m)
f , Pr[f(C
π
h ) = m], i.e, m ← P (m)f , we first show that the output from
Rej
f
h(m, ρ) is distributed identically to C
π
h . For simplicity of notation, let us
define pm , PrP (m)
f
[m]. Let pc denote the probability of drawing c from the
channel distribution Cπh , i.e., pc , PrCπh [c]. For c ∈ Cπh , the probability of ob-
serving c under the Rejfh(m, ρ) procedure is then given by
Pr[Rejfh(m, ρ) = c]
= Pr
c1←C
π
h
[c1 = c] · Pr[f(c1) = m] + Pr
c2←C
π
h
[c2 = c] · Pr[f(c2) = m] · Pr[f(c1) 6= m]
+ Pr
c3←C
t
h
[c3 = c] · Pr[f(c3) = m] · Pr[f(c1) 6= m ∧ f(c2) 6= m] + · · ·
= pcpm + pcpm (1− pm) + · · ·+ pcpm (1− pm)ρ−1 + pc (1− pm)ρ
= pcpm
(
1− (1− pm)ρ
pm
)
+ pc (1− pm)ρ = pc.
From the above discussion, we can see that when the target bit vector m was
chosen from the distribution P
(m)
f , the output from Rej
f
h(m, ρ) is distributed
identically to Cπh . Since f is ǫ-biased, ∆
[
Uη, P
(m)
f
]
≤ ǫ. Hence,
∆
[
Rej
f
h(m← Uη, ρ),Rejfh(m← P (m)f , ρ)
]
≤ ǫ
by Fact 2 which gives us the statement of the lemma.
3 The construction
In this section, we outline our construction of a one-time stegosystem as an
interaction between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver). Alice and Bob
wish to communicate over a channel Cπh with history h. We also assume that the
support of Ch is {0, 1}b, i.e, |Σ| = 2b.
3.1 A one-time stegosystem
Let m ∈ {0, 1}n be the message to be embedded. Our stegosystem uses the RRV
strong-extractor construction as described in Theorem 1 which extracts random-
ness from the distribution Cπh supported on {0, 1}π·b by rejection sampling as
described in Section 2.4. Specifically, we will use the extractor with the seed s
as the function f in the rejection sampling procedure.
Alice and Bob agree on the following:
Extractor Construction. Alice and Bob agree to use the explicit RRV strong-
extractor construction as described in Theorem 1. They use a seed s ∈R
{0, 1}d for the extractor. The length of the seed d will be determined later
as a function of δ, n, b and security ǫ. The notation Es stands for the extrac-
tor used with the seed s i.e., E(·, s). Here, we treat the seed s as private
and in Section 3.4 we show that the seed s may be public and discuss the
implications of this choice.
One-Time Pad. Alice and Bob also use a shared one-time pad secret key
κotp ∈R {0, 1}n effectively transmitting m′ = κotp ⊕m.
Shared Secret Key. The secret key that they now share is κ = (κotp, s) of
length k = n+ d.
Key generation consists of generating the one-time pad secret key κotp ∈R
{0, 1}n and the random seed s of length d to be used with the extractor. The
encoding procedure accepts an input message m of length n bits and outputs
a stegotext of length λ. We will analyze the stegosystem below in terms of the
parameters π, d, λ, ρ and some constant c > 1 relegating discussion of how these
parameters determine the overall efficiency of the system to Section 3.4.
PROCEDURE SE: PROCEDURE SD:
Input: Key κ = (κotp, s); m ∈ {0, 1}n, Input: Key κ = (κotp, s)
history h ∈ Σ∗ stegotext cstego
let m′ = κotp ⊕m
parse m
′
as m
′ = m′1m
′
2 . . .m
′
⌈n/c log n⌉ parse: cstego = c1c2 . . . c⌈n/c log n⌉
for i = 1 to ⌈n/c log n⌉ { for i = 1 to ⌈n/c log n⌉ do {
ci ← Rej
Es
h (m
′
i, ρ) set mi
′ = Es(ci)
set h← h ◦ ci }
} set m′ = m′1m
′
2 . . .m
′
⌈n/c logn⌉
Output: cstego = c1c2 . . . c⌈n/c log n⌉ ∈ Σ
λ
Output: m
′ ⊕ κotp
Fig. 1. Encryption and Decryption algorithms for the one-time stegosystem of 3.1.
Alice and Bob communicate using the algorithm SE for steganographic em-
bedding and SD for decoding as described in Figure 1. In SE, after applying
the one-time pad to randomize her message m, Alice obtains m′ = κotp ⊕m.
She then parses m′ into ⌈n/c logn⌉ blocks, each block of length c logn for some
constant c > 1, i.e., m′ = m1
′
m2
′ . . .m′⌈n/c log n⌉. She then applies the pro-
cedure RejEsh (m
′
i, ρ) to obtain an element ci ∈ Σπ for each block mi′, i =
1, · · · , ⌈n/c logn⌉ of the randomized message. Here, the history h represents the
current history at the time of the rejection sampling procedure which is updated
after the completion of the procedure. Recall that the notation Es stands for
the extractor used with the seed s i.e., E(·, s). The resulting stegotext, denoted
by cstego that is transmitted to Bob is cstego = c1c2 . . . c⌈n/c logn⌉. In SD, the
received stegotext is first parsed into ⌈n/c logn⌉ blocks as shown and then eval-
uated using the extractor with seed s for each block; this results in a message
block. After performing this for each received block, a bit string of length n is
obtained, which is subjected to the one-time pad decoding to obtain the original
message. The detailed security and correctness analysis follow in the next two
sections.
3.2 Security
In this section, we argue about the security of our one-time stegosystem. Specif-
ically, we establish an upper bound on the statistical distance between the “nor-
mal” and “covert” message distributions over the communication channel. First,
by Lemma 2, observe that if the function f is ǫ-biased on Cπh for history h, then
for any ρ, m′ ∈R {0, 1}η: ∆[Rejfh(m′, ρ), Cπh ] ≤ ǫ. Now, consider the strong ex-
tractor Ext : {0, 1}ν×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}µ used in the rejection sampling procedure.
Denote the error of extractor by ǫext. Recall from the remark in Section 2.1 that,
for a uniformly chosen seed s ∈R {0, 1}d, Prs[∆ [Ext(X, s), Uµ] ≥ √ǫext] ≤ √ǫext.
From this we can see that Ext fails to be a
√
ǫext-biased function with probability
no more than
√
ǫext in the choice of the seed s. Thus, for a random m
′ and s,
∆[RejEsh (m
′, ρ), Cπh ] ≤ 1 ·
√
ǫext +
√
ǫext · 1 ≤ 2√ǫext .
We obtain the above inequality by upper bounding the probability of the extrac-
tor being a
√
ǫext-biased function by 1 and observing that the statistical distance
is also upper bounded by 1 by Fact 1. Suppose that in our stegosystem construc-
tion, we had used an independent and uniformly chosen seed si ∈R {0, 1}d for
each message block i = 1, 2, · · · , ⌈n/c logn⌉, the statistical distance between Cλh
and the output of the procedure SE would then be
∆
[
SE(κ,m;O), Cλh
] ≤ 2√ǫext⌈n/c logn⌉.
However, employing an independent and uniformly chosen seed for each message
block would require too much randomness. In our scheme, we employ a single
seed s over all the message blocks and so we need to manage the dependencies
between the output covertexts; this is the major technical issue in the proof,
which is relegated to Appendix A for lack of space. In particular, for any message
m ∈ {0, 1}n, we present an upper bound on ∆ [SE(κ,m;O), Cλh ] when using
a single seed s ∈R {0, 1}d over all the message blocks. We record the theorem
below; the proof appears in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. For any ǫ, δ > 0, message m ∈ {0, 1}n consider the stegosystem
(SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1 under the parameter constraint ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
3ℓ
)3
. Then
it holds that the stegosystem is (ǫ, δ)-secure where ǫext is the extractor error and
ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉ for some constant c > 1.
3.3 Correctness
In this section we obtain an upper bound on the soundness of our stegosystem.
We focus on the mapping between {0, 1}n and Σλ determined by the SE proce-
dure of the one-time stegosystem. We would like to bound the probability of the
stego decoding procedure’s inability to faithfully recover the encoded message.
Theorem 3. For any ǫ, δ > 0, message m ∈ {0, 1}n consider the stegosystem
(SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1 under the parameter constraints ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
6ℓ2
)3
and
ρ ≥ 2nc log(3ℓǫ−1) for some constant c > 1. Then it holds that the stegosystem
is (ǫ, δ)-correct where ǫext is the extractor error and ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉ for some
constant c > 1.
Proof. Recall that the first step of the procedure SE is to randomize the message
m to get m′ = m ⊕ κotp. SE then proceeds to parse m′ into blocks: m′ =
m
′
1
m
′
2
. . .m′
ℓ
, ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉. Let F be the event that SD is unable to correctly
decode the message encoded by SE. We seek to upper bound the probability of
F . We proceed to first estimate the probability of failure for one message block
mi. Let us denote this event by F
′.
Recall that we pick a seed s ∈R {0, 1}d for the extractor we use in our
construction and let ǫext denote the error of the extractor. We say that a seed s is
good if ∀τ, µ (Gτs ) ≥ 1− 3
√
ǫext, τ = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ. We show in Appendix A that the
probability of seed s to be good is given by Prs
[∀τ | µ (Gτs ) ≥ 1− 3√ǫext] ≥ 1−
ℓ 3
√
ǫext. (This follows from straightforward applications of Markov’s inequality.)
Thus that the probability that the seed s is not good is no more than ℓ 3
√
ǫext.
By the union bound this yields
Pr[F ] = ℓ · (Pr[F ′ | s good] · Pr[s good] + Pr[F ′ | s not good] · Pr[s not good])
≤ ℓ · (Pr[F ′ | a good] · 1 + 1 · (ℓ 3√ǫext)) .
We proceed to bound Pr[F ′ | s is good]. We know that when the seed s is good,
for no more than 3
√
ǫext fraction of distributions in every level τ = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ, the
extractor coupled with the seed s is not a 3
√
ǫext-biased function with probability
no more than 3
√
ǫ2ext. So, we get
Pr[F ′ | s good] ≤ 1 ·
(
1−
(
1
2|mi|
− 3√ǫext
))ρ
+ 3
√
ǫext · 1 + 3
√
ǫ2ext · 1
where ρ is the bound on the number of iterations performed by the rejection
sampling procedure. Setting ǫext ≤ 1/(8 · 23|mi|) = 1/(8 · n3c) and
ρ = 2 · 2|mi| · log(3ℓǫ−1) = 2nc log(3ℓǫ−1)
(since in our construction |mi| = c logn, and as ρ is exponential in the block
length, we choose the message block length to be c logn), we have
Pr[F ′ | s good] ≤ ǫ
3ℓ
+ 2 3
√
ǫext .
From the statement of the theorem we have that ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
6ℓ2
)3
and hence
Pr[F ] ≤ ℓ · (Pr[F ′ | s good] · 1 + 1 · (ℓ 3√ǫext)) ≤ ǫ
and the statement of the theorem follows.
We record the security and correctness theorem below.
Theorem 4. For any ǫext ≤ 1/8n3c, δ > 0, message m ∈ {0, 1}n, and ρ ≥
2nc log(ǫ
−1/3
ext ), the stegosystem (SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1 is (ǫcor, δ)-correct
and (ǫsec, δ)-secure, where ǫcor ≤ 4ℓ2 3√ǫext and ǫsec ≤ 3ℓ 3√ǫext. Here, ǫext is the
extractor error and ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉ for some constant c > 1.
3.4 Putting it all together
The objective of this section is to integrate the results of the previous sections of
the paper. We first show that our steganography protocol embeds a message of
length n bits using a shared secret key of length (1+ o(1))n bits while achieving
security 2−n/ polylogn. In this sense, our protocol is randomness efficient in the
shared key. We next show that by permitting a portion of the shared secret key
to be public while retaining n private key bits, we can achieve security of 2−n.
Let us first start our discussion by considering the parameters of the extractor
construction we employ in our protocol.
Extractor Parameters Recall that π is the parameter that dictates how
many copies of the channel Alice decides to use in order to transform the
channel C with min-entropy δ into a channel Cπ with min-entropy πδ. If we
let π = δ−1 · (c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1)) for some constant c > 1, the chan-
nel distribution Cπh supported on {0, 1}δ
−1·(c log n+2 log(1/ǫext)+O(1))·b has a min-
entropy of at least t = c logn+2 log (1/ǫext)+O (1). To put this all together, the
RRV strong-extractor is a function Ext : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}t−∆ where
ν = δ−1 · (c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1)) · b
d = O
(
log2
(
δ−1 · (c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1)) · b
) · log (1/ǫext) · log t)
t = c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1)
∆ = 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1) and
t−∆ = c logn
We can immediately see from the preceding discussion that our stegotext is
of length
n
c logn
·δ−1 ·(c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1))·b = n
δ
(
1 +
2 log (1/ǫext)
c logn
+ o (1)
)
·b
bits to embed n bits of message.
Randomness Efficiency Recall that the shared secret key between Alice and
Bob is comprised of the one-time pad κotp ∈R {0, 1}n of length n and the
extractor seed s ∈R {0, 1}d of length d bits, i.e., κ = (κotp, s). Also, the length
of the seed from the above discussion is given by
d = O
(
log2
(
δ−1 · (c logn+ 2 log (1/ǫext) +O (1)) · b
) · log (1/ǫext) · log t) .
Notice the relationship between the error of the extractor ǫext and the desired
security from our stegosystem ǫ is given by ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
3ℓ
)3
from Theorem 2. When
we let ǫ = 2−n/ log
O(1) n, we can see that the length of the seed d = o(n). Thus
we can embed a message of length n bits using a shared secret key of length
(1 + o(1))n bits while achieving security 2−n/ log
O(1) n. Suppose, we were to let
the extractor seed of length d be public, observe now that we can attain ǫ = 2−n
security in the length of the shared private key of length n. The seed length can
now be given by d = O(n log n log2(δ−1bn)). For small ǫ, the relationship between
the seed length d and security ǫ can be given by d = O
(
log3
(
log
(
ǫ−3
))
log
(
ǫ−3
))
.
We would like to note that our protocol offers a non-trivial improvement over
the protocol offered by Kiayias et al. [5] as in their protocol, they need O(n)
secret bits regardless of the security achieved.
Also, when we elect to make use of the public randomness for the d bits
for the extractor seed, we obtain constant overhead as well. In particular, the
length of the shared secret key is equal to the length of the message, n bits while
attaining 2−n security.
In this context of making the seed of the extractor public, we would like to
explain our model and clarify the implications of making the seed public. In
our model for steganography, we assume that the communication channel is not
adversarially controlled. In particular, the adversary is not allowed to reconfigure
the channel distributions once the seed has been made public. In this sense, the
channel is chosen and fixed first, then a seed s is chosen uniformly at random
and made public. In other words, we require that the randomness in the seed s
is independent of the channel. Indeed, in a stronger model where the adversary
does have the ability to readapt the channel distributions, we would need to keep
the seed private. From our above discussion, we can see that our stegosytem of
Section 3.1 is still (ǫ, δ)-correct and (ǫ, δ)-secure when the seed s is public.
Theorem 5. For any ǫ, δ > 0, message m ∈ {0, 1}n consider the stegosystem
(SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1 under the parameter constraints ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
6ℓ2
)3
and
ρ ≥ 2nc log(3ℓǫ−1) for some constant c > 1. Then for every channel, if the key
κotp ∈R {0, 1}n is private and the seed s ∈R {0, 1}n is public, then it holds
that the stegosystem is (ǫ, δ)-correct and (ǫ, δ)-secure. Here, ǫext is the extractor
error and ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉ for some constant c > 1. The stegosystem exhibits
O(1) overhead, the length of the shared private key is equal to the length of the
message.
4 A provably secure stegosystem for longer messages
In Appendix B we show how to apply the “one-time” stegosystem of Section 3.1
together with a pseudorandom generator so that longer messages can be trans-
mitted as shown by Kiayias et al. [5].
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A Security Proof
In this section, we provide the proof for Theorem 2 from Section 3.2.
Theorem 6. For any ǫ, δ > 0, message m ∈ {0, 1}n consider the stegosystem
(SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1 under the parameter constraint ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
3ℓ
)3
. Then
it holds that the stegosystem is (ǫ, δ)-secure where ǫext is the extractor error and
ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉ for some constant c > 1.
Proof. We start the encoding procedure SE with history h which embeds mes-
sage blocks into the channel using rejection sampling. We want to show that the
statistical distance between the output of SE and Cλh is given by
∆
[
SE(κ,m;O), Cλh
] ≤ ǫ
where λ is the length of the output by procedure SE.
First, we define some notation to capture the operation of the procedure SE.
Let C1 denote the distribution at depth 1 that results by sampling c1 ← Cπh ;
C2 denotes the distribution at depth 2 that results by sampling c1 ← Cπh and
c2 ← Cπh◦c1 . We likewise define Cτ for τ ≤ ℓ. We define the random variables
R1, · · · , Rτ obtained by rejection sampling in the same fashion. To be precise,
for a message m′ = κotp ⊕m = m1′ ◦m2′ ◦ · · · ◦mℓ′ and |mτ ′| = c logn we
define
C1 , C
π
h , Cτ , C
π
h◦C1◦···◦Cτ−1 ,
for τ ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}. Likewise, we define the random variables Rτ :
R1 , Rej
Es(·)
h (m1
′, ρ) , Rτ , Rej
Es(·)
h◦R1◦···◦Rτ−1
(mτ
′, ρ) .
Finally, in anticipation of the proof below, we define a “hybrid” random variable
Hτ = Rej
Es(·)
h◦C1◦···◦Cτ−1
(mτ
′, ρ)
which corresponds to the distribution obtained by selecting C1, . . . , Cτ−1 from
the natural channel distribution, and then selecting the τth channel element via
rejection sampling.
Now, let us analyze the implications of picking a uniformly random seed
s ∈R {0, 1}d for the extractor as we do in our construction. Recall that ǫext
denotes the error of the extractor. First, we show that for each depth τ , the
probability mass of distributions for which the extractor coupled with the seed
s yields a 3
√
ǫext-biased function is large.
We say that a channel distribution C is
(
s, 3
√
ǫext
)
-good if Es is 3
√
ǫext-biased
on C. Otherwise we say that the distribution C is
(
s, 3
√
ǫext
)
-bad. With this
definition in place, recall that a strong extractor has the property that for any
distribution C on the right domain with sufficient min-entropy,
Pr
s
[C is (s, 3
√
ǫext) -bad] ≤ ǫ2/3ext . (1)
Define now the following sets for τ ∈ {0, · · · , ℓ− 1}:
Gτs =
{
(c1, c2, · · · , cτ ) | Cπh◦c1◦c2◦···◦cτ is (s, 3
√
ǫext) -good
}
and
Bτs =
{
(c1, c2, · · · , cτ ) | Cπh◦c1◦c2◦···◦cτ is (s, 3
√
ǫext) -bad
}
,
where |ci| = π. The two sets Gτs and Bτs denote the collection of
(
s, 3
√
ǫext
)
-good
and
(
s, 3
√
ǫext
)
-bad distributions at depth τ , respectively. Let µ (Bτs ) denote
Pr [Cτπh ∈ Bτs ], the total probability mass of the set Bτs . Define µ (Gτs ) simi-
larly. Observe that in light of Equation 1 above, the expected mass of Bτs over
the choice of a uniform seed s is Es [µ (B
τ
s )] ≤ ǫ2/3ext . By Markov’s inequality
Prs
[
µ (Bτs ) ≥ 3
√
ǫext
] ≤ 3√ǫext and, then, by the union bound we conclude
Pr
s
[∃τ < ℓ | µ (Bτs ) ≥ 3
√
ǫext] ≤ ℓ 3√ǫext .
where ℓ = ⌈n/c logn⌉, the number of message blocks. We say that a seed s is
good if ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ℓ}, µ (Gτs ) ≥ 1 − 3
√
ǫext. To summarize the discussion
above, for randomly chosen s,
Pr
s
[s is good] ≥ 1− ℓ 3√ǫext .
Now, fix a good seed s. We will now prove that for a good seed s,
∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cℓ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rℓ)] ≤ ℓ · (3 3√ǫext) . (2)
We prove this by induction on τ , the number of message blocks. When τ = 1,
∆ [C1, R1] ≤ 2√ǫext ≤ 2 3√ǫext ,
as desired. In general, assuming
∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cτ ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rτ )] ≤ τ · (2 3√ǫext) .
for a particular value τ , we wish to establish the inequality for τ + 1. Observe
that
∆
[
(C1, C2, · · · , Cτ+1) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rτ+1)
]
≤ ∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cτ ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rτ )] + E
C1,...,Cτ
[
∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1]
]
(Lemma 1)
≤ τ · (2 3√ǫext) + E
C1,...,Cτ
[
∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1]
]
(by induction.)
As for the expectation EC1,...,Cτ
[
∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1]
]
, observe that
EC1,...,Cτ
[
∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1]
]
≤ Pr[(C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Gτs ] · E [∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1] | (C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Gτs ]
+ Pr[(C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Bτs ] · E[∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1] | (C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Gτs ]
≤ E[∆ [Cτ+1, Hτ+1] | (C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Gτs ] + Pr[(C1, . . . , Cτ ) ∈ Bτs ]
≤ 3√ǫext + 3√ǫext ,
as s is good. We can conclude that for a good seed s,
∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cτ ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rτ )] ≤ τ · (2 3√ǫext) ,
for any τ ≤ ℓ. The total statistical distance is now given by
∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cℓ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rℓ)]
= ∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cℓ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rℓ)] |s good ·Pr[s good ]+
∆ [(C1, C2, · · · , Cℓ) , (R1, R2, · · · , Rℓ)] |s not good ·Pr[s not good ]
≤ ℓ · (2 3√ǫext) · 1 + 1 · (ℓ 3√ǫext) ≤ 3ℓ 3√ǫext ≤ ǫ .
The last inequality is because of the fact that ǫext ≤
(
ǫ
3ℓ
)3
. Thus,
∆
[
SE(κ,m;O), Cλh
] ≤ ǫ
and the theorem follows by the definition of insecurity.
B A provably secure stegosystem for longer messages
In this section we show how to apply the “one-time” stegosystem of Section 3.1
together with a pseudorandom generator so that longer messages can be trans-
mitted as shown by Kiayias et al. [5].
Definition 10. Let Uk denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}k. A polyno-
mial time deterministic algorithm G is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if the
following conditions are satisfied:
Variable output For all seeds x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and y ∈ N, |G(x, 1y)| = y.
Pseudorandomness For every polynomial p the set of random variables
{G(Uk, 1p(k))}k∈N is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform dis-
tribution {Up(k)}k∈N.
For a PRG G and 0 < k < k′, if A is some statistical test, we define the
advantage of A over the PRG as follows:
AdvAG(k, k
′) =
∣∣∣∣ Pr
w←G(Uk,1k
′ )
[A(w) = 1]− Pr
w←Uk′
[A(w) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
The insecurity of the above PRG G against all statistical tests A computable by
circuits of size ≤ P is then defined as
InSecG(k, k
′;P ) = max
A∈AP
{AdvAG(k, k′)}
where AP is the collection of statistical tests computable by circuits of size ≤ P .
It is convenient for our application that typical PRGs have a procedure G′
such that if z = G(x, 1y), it holds that G(x, 1y+y
′
) = G′(x, z, 1y
′
) (i.e., if one
maintains z, one can extract the y′ bits that follow the first y bits without
starting from the beginning).
Consider now the following stegosystem S′ = (SK ′, SE′, SD′) that can be
used for steganographic transmission of longer messages using the one-time
stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) as defined in Section 3.1. S′ can handle mes-
sages of length polynomial in the security parameter k and employs a PRG G.
The two players Alice and Bob, share a key of length k denoted by x. The func-
tion SE′ is given input x and the message m ∈ {0, 1}ν to be transmitted of
length ν = p(k) for some fixed polynomial p. SE′ in turn employs the PRG G
to extract k′ bits (it computes κ = G(x, 1k
′
), |κ| = k′). The length k′ is selected
to match the number of key bits that are required to transmit the message m
using the one-time stegosystem of Section 3.1. Once the key κ of length k′ is
produced by the PRG, the procedure SE′ invokes the one-time stegosystem on
input κ,m, h. The function SD′ is defined in a straightforward way based on
SD.
The computational insecurity of the stegosystem S′ is defined by adapting
the definition of information theoretic stegosystem security from Section 2.3 for
the computationally bounded adversary as follows:
InSecS′(k, k
′;P ) = max
A∈AP
{AdvAS′(k, k′)} ,
this maximum taken over all adversaries A, where SA1 and SA2 have circuit
size ≤ P and the definition of advantage AdvAS′(k, k′) is obtained by suitably
modifying the definition of AdvAS (k) in Section 2.3. In particular, we define a
new adversarial game GA(1k, 1k
′
) which proceeds as the previous game GA(1k)
in Section 2.3 except that in this new gameGA(1k, 1k
′
), algorithms SA1 and SA2
receive as input the security parameter k′ and SE′ invokes SE as SE(κ,m∗;O)
where κ = G(x, 1k
′
).
Theorem 7. The stegosystem S′ = (SK ′, SE′, SD′) is provably secure in the
model of [2] (steganographically secret against chosen hiddentext attacks); in par-
ticular employing a PRG G to transmit a message m we get InSecS′(k, k
′;P ) ≤
InSecG(k, k
′;P ) + InSecS′(k
′) where InSecS′(k
′) is the information theoretic
insecurity defined in Section 2.3 and |m| = ℓ(k′).
C Omitted proofs
Proof (Lemma 1). For x ∈ X denote Pr[X = x] by Px and Pr[Yx = y] by Py|x.
Define P ′x and P
′
y|x similarly. Then we may compute
∆ [(X,Y ) , (X ′, Y ′)] =
1
2
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
∣∣∣Px · Py|x − P ′x · P ′y|x
∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
x,y
∣∣∣Px · Py|x − Px · P ′y|x
∣∣∣+ 1
2
∑
x,y
∣∣∣Px · P ′y|x − P ′x · P ′y|x
∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
x,y
Px ·
∣∣∣Py|x − P ′y|x
∣∣∣+ 1
2
∑
x,y
P ′y|x · |Px − P ′x|
= E
X
[
∆ [YX , Y
′
X ]
]
+∆ [X,X ′] .
